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Abstract 
This paper presents an overview of ontologies in Information Systems Security. 
Information Systems Security is a broad and dynamic area that clearly benefits from the 
formalizations of concepts provided by ontologies.  After a very short presentation of 
ontologies and Semantic Web, several works in Security Ontologies targeting different 
aspects of security engineering are presented together with another study that compares 
several publicly available security ontologies. 
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1. Introduction 
Information Systems today spread almost everywhere in our society. Governments, public 
organizations, private companies (and at the very end, all of us) all critically depend on 
Information Systems. One consequence of this is that Information Systems security becomes an 
increasingly important area and must be considered at every stages of Information Systems 
lifecycle, from conception to maintenance [Mouratidis, et al. 2005]. 
However, security is a very active field, were too much terminology is vaguely defined [Donner 
2003]. This leads to difficulties for security experts to communicate clearly about security 
incidents, not only with non-expert people but also between experts. A solution for this situation 
is the development of an ontology for Information Systems security that includes the most 
important concepts in the field, and the relations among them. Such ontology will greatly help 
the organization and communication in the field [Donner 2003]. 
 Ontologies in computer science aroused from the field of Artificial Intelligence, and allow us to 
represent knowledge about a given domain in a structured, formal and machine processable 
form. For this knowledge to be representative, it must be agreed (shared) by community 
members. This formalization of shareable concepts delivered by ontologies provide us better 
communication, reusability and organization of knowledge, as well as a better computational 
inference [Blanco, et al. 2008]. 
 In 2001, Tim Berners-Lee proposed a new Web concept: a Semantic Web [Berners-Lee, et al. 
2001]. “The Semantic Web is not a separate Web but an extension of the current one, in which 
information is  given well-defined meaning,  better  enabling computers  and  people  to work  
in  cooperation“. Information on the Semantic Web is represented in such a way that computers 
can understand it. It can be used by computers not only for display purposes, as in current Web, 
but also for interoperability and integration between systems and applications. This brought a 
renewed interest to ontologies, as they provide a formal framework for supporting explicit 
machine processable semantics definition, and they enable the derivation of implicit knowledge 
through automated inference. This emerging semantic Web, with all its revolutionary potential, 
brings new challenges to computer interactions, both with humans and between computers, and 
security plays a vital role in its success. Security semantics are used to provide better 
communication of security concepts and to allow better support to security based decisions. 
In this paper, we present an overview of the use of ontologies in Information Systems Security. 
After this short introduction, ontologies (what are ontologies) are briefly presented in section II 
and Semantic Web and Semantic Web Services, as huge application field for security 
ontologies, are presented in Section III. In section IV we present some applications using 
security ontologies and, finally, in Section V we conclude by making a summary of this paper 
and pointing some open issues in the use of security ontologies. 
2. Ontologies 
Ontologies, whose name was borrowed from philosophy, became very popular in computer 
science and information systems. This popularity comes from its promise of a shared and 
common understanding of a domain that can be communicated between humans and 
applications. 
An ontology defines the terms used to describe and represent an area of knowledge. It is a 
conceptual model, yet executable, that contains a description of important concepts in a domain, 
relations among them, crucial properties of each concept and restrictions on properties. By using 
knowledge representation techniques, based in first order logical formalisms, this model is 
interpretable by computers and, therefore, can be used by Information Systems to make better 
decisions supported in domain knowledge. 
To make ontologies available to information systems, various ontology languages have been 
developed and proposed for standardization. The most popular is OWL1  – Web Ontology 
Language, which has been standardized by W3C consortium2. 
3. Semantic Web 
The Semantic Web [Berners-Lee, et al. 2001] is the vision of a Web with meaning, in which 
information is processed both by computers and by humans. This is achieved through the use of 
computer processable semantically rich metadata for Web resources, describing their meaning, 
which is expressed in ontologies. This is in opposition with the current Web, were computers 
are not able to give meaning to data. 
In the field of Semantic Web, Semantic Web Services are of particular interest due to the power 
and flexibility they promise. Semantic Web Services are Web Services that are self-described 
and amenable to automated discovery, composition and invocation [Cabral, et al. 2004]. They 
bring the technology from Semantic Web to the area of Web Services.  
                                                     
1 http://www.w3.org/2004/OWL 
2 http://www.w3.org 
 Web services are well-defined, reusable, software components that perform specific, 
encapsulated tasks via standardized Web-oriented mechanisms. They can be discovered, 
invoked, and the composition of several services can be choreographed, using well-defined 
workflow modeling frameworks. Current Web Services’ technology mainly uses open standards 
(like UDDI3, XML4, SOAP5, etc.) that provide no semantic description about their 
functionalities. This lack of semantics implies human intervention for tasks like service 
discovery and composition, which complicates their usage in complex systems. 
Semantic Web Services are Web services with formal descriptions of their properties, 
capabilities, interfaces and effects. These formal descriptions, described using ontological 
languages, provide semantics to the Web services, and will play an important role in automatic 
service discovery, composition, invocation and monitoring without human intervention (from 
[Studer, et al. 2007]): 
 When searching for a service providing a specific functionality, ontologies and 
associated thesauri can provide synonyms of words, the taxonomic structure of service 
capabilities, relationships between service capabilities, etc. 
 When trying to harmonize different data formats for two services which have to 
exchange messages, ontologies can provide elaborated conceptual data models for 
message descriptions, which facilitate automated translation. 
 When mediating different communication protocols of services to work together, highly 
expressive Semantic Web languages can provide well-founded means to describe 
interaction patterns in communication protocols. 
 When trying to compose complex business processes from given partial processes 
implemented by a number of Web Services, automated planning algorithms can be 
employed, provided the semantics of the input services is formally defined. 
Semantic Web Services have the potential to change the way knowledge and business services 
are consumed and provided on the Web [Cabral, et al. 2004]. 
The ontological languages currently used are OWL-S6, WSMO7, WSDL-S8 and SWSA/SWSL9. 
4. Security Ontologies 
Security ontologies are ontologies applied to the domain of information systems security. In this 
section, we present some relevant work on security ontologies. 
Application Development 
One of the stages in a Software Engineering process is Requirements Engineering that aims to 
produce models to assist in the development of applications. Since an ontology is based in a 
logical formalism and explicitly models domain knowledge in a machine interpretable way, it 
                                                     
3 http://uddi.org/pubs/uddi_v3.html 
4 http://www.w3.org/XML 
5 http://www.w3.org/TR/soap 
6 http://www.w3.org/Submission/2004/SUBM-OWL-S-20041122 
7 http://www.w3.org/Submission/WSMO 
8 http://www.w3.org/Submission/2005/10 
9 http://www.daml.org/services/swsl 
 has long been recognized the benefits of their use in the field of Requirements Engineering. 
This is the reason for numerous works addressing the use of ontologies in the Requirements 
Engineering field. However, in [Dobson and Sawyer 2006] the specific area of Dependability 
Requirements Engineering is identified as one on which little effort has been made to define an 
ontology, even though dependability is a very important area for many systems. Contrary to 
what occurs in many other domains, a consensus exists in the field of dependability, thanks to 
the works from IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Fault Tolerant Computing and 
IFIP Working Group 10.4 on Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance10. Based on that 
works, authors created an ontology compliant with the IFIP Working Group 10.4 taxonomy 
[Dobson and Sawyer 2006]. This ontology can be used, together with requirements’ ontologies 
and domain ontologies, to form the basis of a dependability requirements engineering process 
with strong tool support. 
Despite the fact that nowadays security is a concern for most applications, for some applications 
security is of critical importance, not only in terms of functionality, but also in terms of a trust 
environment with increased security and privacy features required for user confidence, as is the 
case of e-government applications. In [Karyda, et al. 2006] the issue of accommodating security 
requirements in the development of secure applications is addressed by the use of a security 
ontology. That ontology captures and formalizes security knowledge from security experts and 
aims to support and improve communication between security experts, users and developers. 
Furthermore, it is intended to facilitate software developers to address security requirements at 
an early stage in the software development process and to support security related design 
choices. 
Inter-organizational Database Access 
Ontologies are also used in preserving privacy of databases belonging to different organizations 
that must provide access to users from the other organizations. The Privacy Access Control 
Toolkit (PACTS) was presented in [Mitra, et al. 2006]. It proposes a solution for privacy of an 
organization database schema, not data privacy, when delivering access to a partner 
organization. This schema privacy is achieved with Organization Ontologies (one from each 
organization), which are generated to include the organization database terms and some term 
synonyms. These ontologies are sent to a mediator system where they are compared to generate 
an ontology-mapping table. Ontologies act here simply as a way of obfuscating database 
schemas, since these never leave the owner organization. Additionally, access control can be 
delivered by using a similar process to create a role-mapping table that maps one organization 
role hierarchy into the other organization role hierarchy. A more detailed work on this role 
mapping for the purposes of authentication can be found in [Pan, et al. 2006]. This solution has 
the drawback that ontology and role hierarchy mappings must always be created between all the 
organizations that share accesses to their internal databases. 
Security Attacks 
Another use of security ontologies is in the characterization of security attacks on information 
systems. Since systems become highly distributed and increasingly complicated, application 
components have to collaborate to achieve system goals, and have to face new types of attacks, 
specially distributed attacks which are difficult to identify and mitigate [Vorobiev, et al. 2008]. 
In this scenario, communication between applications, or between distributed application 
components, regarding security attacks and countermeasures must be encouraged, because it can 
improve the detection and resistance to such attacks. Since application components may have 
different proveniences (developed by different companies), collaboration is at risk if a common 
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 basis vocabulary lacks. To fulfill this lack, in [Vorobiev, et al. 2008] is proposed a set of 
security ontologies which specify information security issues, allowing the sharing of a common 
understanding of information about attacks and defenses among humans and computers. 
Semantic Web Services 
Security plays an important role in Semantic Web Services, as in Web Services, since they can 
operate across the boundaries of independent organizations. Issues related to service protection 
and security, reliability of results, or validity of source and cost become important. One crucial 
issue is the dynamic nature of many transactions, where service requesters and service providers 
interact without any prior direct trust relationship. In these situations, trust relationships must be 
established on the fly and for a limited purpose and time. To facilitate such establishment of 
trust, in [Denker, et al. 2003] is proposed the annotation of service descriptions with information 
relating their security requirements and capabilities. Two security ontologies are proposed: 
Credential ontology, which summarizes various ways in which authentication using credentials 
take place, and Security ontology, which summarizes at a very high abstraction level many of 
the commonly used security-related notations that can be used to describe user, agent or security 
service policies. This information can then be used during matchmaking processes to ensure that 
clients and service providers meets each other security requirements.  
In further work, [Kagal, et al. 2004] and [Denker, et al. 2005] added security and privacy 
policies to the above mentioned proposal. They claim that policies should be part of the 
representation of the Web service, because they provide the specification of who can use a 
service under which conditions, how information should be provided to the service and how 
provided information will be used later. Consequently, they propose the extension of OWL-S to 
include policies and suggest the inclusion of a property for describing the different policies that 
must be enforced for the correct execution of a service. In their work, they address three kinds 
of policies: authorization, privacy and confidentiality. An authorization policy is a set of rules 
that restrict access to a service. Authorization policies constrain the provider to only accept 
requests for service from certain clients. Privacy policies specify what information can be 
exchanged, the legitimate uses of that information and the condition under which this exchange 
is possible. Privacy policies are interpreted as an obligation from its publisher and can then act 
as a contract. Confidentiality policies describe the cryptographic characteristics of the input and 
output parameters of a service, e.g., all communication must be encrypted. To describe policies 
they use Rei11, a logic-based language for policy specifications based in RDF12 and RDFS13. 
Associated with a policy language is a policy engine that interprets and reasons over the policies 
and domain information to make decisions about applicable permissions and prohibitions. 
Web service security was further extended in [Ashri, et al. 2004], which investigates security 
implications that arise due to interactions between service providers and clients that operate 
from within different domains where different security policies may hold and different security 
capabilities exist. They propose a Semantic Firewall, a security device that makes use of 
Semantic Web technology, to reason about where the interacting entities are able to support the 
required security policies and whether the interactions that take place are those expected given 
the aims of the interaction. In order to perform such reasoning, the device requires knowledge of 
what are the security policies of the secured site (site policies), and what are the expected 
interactions for a given task (user-defined workflow or process policies). The main challenge is 
describing the appropriate workflows. The semantic Firewall needs to have access to workflows 
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 describing the associated parties, the expected series of interactions and the temporal, data and 
causal dependencies between them. Workflows can also be annotated with security related 
requirements. The candidate technologies for describing workflows are the Process Model 
Ontology, defined by OWL-S, and conversational policies [Smith, et al. 1998]. 
Security ontologies developed by Denker et al and Kagal et al [Denker, et al. 2003, Kagal, et al. 
2004], named as DAML security ontology, serves as a basis for the security ontology presented 
by Kim et al [Kim, et al. 2005]. This work, that comes from the military area, points some 
problems in the DAML security ontology, namely for not being intuitive to understand, and 
refines and extends it to include additional security information, namely to represent security 
devices (military and commercial), firewall or military security policy instances and algorithms 
supported by a protocol. The reasoning algorithm from [Denker, et al. 2003] is also enhanced to 
take into account property attributes. This allows supporting cases where both the requirement 
and the capability point to the same concept, but the concepts are annotated with different 
properties, e.g., both requestor and provider use SSH (Secure Shell) but one requires SSH with 
TripleDES encryption and the other SSH with AES encryption, these two should not match. 
An Ontology for Information Systems Security domain 
The security ontologies presented in all previous sections were defined and used for particular 
fields or domains of interest. The Security Ontology reclaimed by Donner [Donner 2003] to be 
used as a global reference to the Information Systems Security discipline is still missing.  
An approach to this security ontology was made in [Tsoumas and Gritzalis 2006]. They made 
an attempt to assist in the security management of today organizations, where security experts 
deal with a variety of diverse security related information knowledge sources, ranging from 
security standards, security tools, security policies, management which formulates the 
organization security objectives, etc. They propose a framework for security knowledge 
acquisition and management to support the process leading from informal, high-level statements 
found in policy and risk assessment documents to deployable technical controls. This 
framework is based in a security ontology that extends the DMTF CIM model14 with ontological 
semantics, in order to use it as a container for information systems security related information, 
based on widely accepted security management standards. 
A comparison of security ontologies is made in Blanco et al. [Blanco, et al. 2008] and they 
conclude that a complete security ontology has not yet been accomplished by the scientific 
community: most of the work in security ontologies has been focused in specific domains or in 
the semantic web. They recognize that the goal of a complete ontology for the security field 
cannot be an isolated task, since it is impossible to formalize all the existing concepts; it can 
only be achieved with the collaboration of all the security community by joining and improving 
the developed ontologies for the specific domains. Their main conclusion, after reviewing a set 
of selected ontologies, is that the analyzed security ontologies are still in early stages of 
development, therefore not mature enough for being reused and extended to accomplish the 
complete security ontology goal. 
5. Summary 
This paper presents an overview of recent work in the field of security ontologies. Security 
ontologies are an important topic due to the increasing importance of security in Information 
Systems and the need of a common language for the Information Systems security area. 
Presented works come from areas like application development, inter-organizational database 
                                                     
14 Distributed Management Task Force, Inc. (DMTF) Common Information Model (CIM) Standards. 
http://www.dmtf.org/standards/cim 
 access, management of security attacks in distributed environments, semantic web services and 
information systems security management. We also summarized a study that analyses several 
publicly available security ontologies and concludes that  the use of ontologies in Information 
Systems security is an emerging subject still in its infancy [Blanco, et al. 2008] and still open to 
new contributions, both with new applications using security ontologies and for the achievement 
of a Security Ontology to organize the thinking and discussion of concepts in information 
systems security domain, as reclaimed in [Donner 2003]. 
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